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Oxford-trained liberal theorist and practicing teacher, Meira Levinson,
offers a well-articulated argument for her vision of the ideal liberal
education in The Demands of Liberal Education. Particularly helpful for
those of us who struggle to convey the aims of liberal education to our
children and students, she provides an eloquent explanation as she
describes her ideal school and the steps necessary for its realization:
The aim of liberal education is to teach children the skills,
habits, knowledge, and dispositions for them to be
thoughtful, mature, self-assured individuals who map their
path in the world with care and confidence, take
responsibility for their actions, fulfill their duties as citizens,
question themselves and others when appropriate, listen to
and learn from others, and ultimately lead their lives with
dignity, integrity, and self-respect—i.e. to be autonomous in
the fullest sense of the word (1999, p. 164).
As her words paint a portrait of an educated individual, we can see that it
is colored by autonomy, a central tenet throughout her work.
Striving to fill the literature gap existing between specialized writings on
liberalism and the slew of commentary on liberal civic education,
Levinson sets out to clarify the more general connection between
contemporary political theory and education policy. She endeavors to
dispel false intuitions about liberalism adopted by theorists and
practitioners as they shape education policy so that she can make
liberalism a more coherent theory with an integrated understanding of
education as essential to its success. This stated intent made me a bit
uncomfortable from the outset, for I feared that she may focus too much
on improving education as it relates to strengthening liberalism, rather
than giving sufficient attention to improving education itself so that
liberal goals can be actualized in citizens. Though this doubt lingered
with me as I read, I began to see that, for Levinson, these two goals
should not and cannot be separated, for their achievement is
codependent.
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Her first chapter begins with a methodical defining of liberalism which
may be of little interest to those already familiar with the political theory,
but eases newcomers into her argument and acquaints them with its
position in the history of liberal talk. From the beginning, she explicitly
states that she will not defend liberalism and its principles, which is an
acceptable omission given that the topic of her book already assumes
their recognized importance. Other exclusions in her initial defining of
liberalism are not as acceptable, however. Although she briefly justifies
scholars who have influenced her preferred understanding of
contemporary liberalism from a small list of well-knowns (Rawls,
Locke, Hobbes, Mill, and the like), she does not bother justifying that list
as opposed to one of more recent, perhaps lesser-knowns, who further or
challenge the liberal frameworks uttered by these men. Similarly, she
tends to simplify liberalism into a political/autonomy-based divide.
Surely liberalism is more nuanced than these alternatives, such that one
cannot be judged superior to the other without being influenced by or
paying respect to third-party liberal voices or critics. Inclusion of these
others would make her portrayal of liberalism more accurately complex
and might make the liberalism she favors more convincing.
Nonetheless, she aptly defines the three elements of contemporary liberal
theory as (a) the fact of pluralism, where there are many conceptions of
the good life; (b) the legitimation process, whereby free and equal
citizens consensually adopt governing principles and institutions; and (c)
substantive liberal institutions, which form a constitutional democracy
respective of individual liberties and conceptions of the good life. As she
rightly claims, liberals of varying types struggle to unify these elements.
Picking on political liberals who are not as supportive of the centrality of
autonomy as she is, Levinson tries to show that political liberalism
requires at least a rudimentary level of autonomy in order for unification
to be achievable by way of justifying liberal freedoms and institutions.
She challenges Rawls and others from his political camp by arguing
against their claim that autonomy is just a capacity. Instead, she asserts
that it is a good that is a necessary and central part of contemporary
liberal theory. She proposes that liberal freedoms and institutions are
best grounded in a weakly perfectionist sense of autonomy, which she
initially defines as the ability to form, evaluate, revise, and realize one’s
own conception of the good. An alternative to political liberalism,
Levinson defines a weakly perfectionist state as one that “(1) values
individual autonomy and provides citizens the means and freedoms to
exercise it; (2) treats all responsible, self-authenticating individuals as
equal citizens; and therefore (3) does not discriminate against nonautonomous citizens in protecting their rights or fulfilling its obligation
toward them” (p. 22). Her disagreement with political liberalism,
however, lingers throughout the book, popping up here and there as she
adopts some of its claims while persistently trying to show the
superiority of autonomy-based weak perfectionism. Even after its initial
overturn in this first chapter, she brings it up repeatedly, just to shut it
down, seemingly beating a dead horse.
As she defends autonomy-valuing liberalism, she tries to fashion a
conception of autonomy that is substantive, yet as minimal as possible,
and with wide appeal. In the spirit of her liberal predecessor, Eamonn
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Callan (1988), she points out that autonomy is a word used by people in
many different ways and that philosophers cannot define it out of thin air
to serve their purposes. Appropriately, then, she attempts to define
autonomy without diverging too far from its commonly used sense of
“self-rule.” While this gives her project a grounded feel and makes her
argument comprehensible to the lay person, it goes against her intent to
shatter uncritical intuitions which are widely held about liberalism. This
should include scrutinizing the common use of a liberal term such as
autonomy before adopting that use as pivotal to her seemingly more
thorough employment, Callan’s warning notwithstanding.
Insofar as her version of liberalism is committed to the adult exercise of
autonomy, Levinson believes liberalism must be held to the
corresponding commitment of developing autonomy in future adults, i.e.,
children. She rightly identifies necessary preconditions for autonomy in
terms of first achieving personhood. Autonomy requires personality
which enables one to be a choosing agent by virtue of having an identity
from which to begin considering alternatives. She describes this in terms
of “cultural coherence” in that one’s culture provides the values and
identities necessary for one to identify one’s self. Being embedded in a
culture also allows a person to use the normative framework of that
culture to consider alternative lifestyles found elsewhere. An individual’s
autonomy is also dependent on a plurality of constitutive values and
beliefs. By aligning one’s self with some values and not others, one is
able to have a standpoint from which to consider certain values one
holds as well as those of other’s without putting one’s identity as a whole
in jeopardy. They also allow an individual to introspectively consider the
criticisms others make of him or her. Interestingly, the liberal “fact of
plurality” becomes quietly transformed into the “good of plurality” as
the book develops. It is a good because it contributes to the good,
autonomy, by requiring individuals to defend their chosen conceptions of
the good against a range of others available to them. Sufficient
justification for its elevated status in her particular understanding of
liberalism seems lacking and its skewing effect on the three elements of
liberalism that she is trying to unify is overlooked. Moreover, her
differentiation between the existence of many, often competing,
conceptions of the good amongst peoples and the existence of a variety
of substantive values held by an individual is problematically unclear.
To my delight, however, plurality as an autonomy-promoting good is
linked to an autonomy-promoting community, for whose interest she
argues that liberal freedoms and institutions must be designed to protect.
Hence, she moves liberalism from its commonly known emphasis on
individuals to its lesser appreciated concern for communities, along the
way unveiling the tedious co-dependency of liberalism on a plural public
culture for its own survival. But while plural communities provide the
conditions for the exercise of autonomy, schools offer the best space for
its development. And it is to this which she turns in chapter two. There,
she provides a lengthy paragraph which lists personal qualities needed
for developing and achieving autonomy. These range from clear selfexpression to imagination and from literacy to being culturally socialized.
While her sense of autonomy is admittedly demanding and difficult to
fully achieve, the characteristics she lists are admirable and capable of
being fulfilled in a supportive context. Her sense of autonomy fits with
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the idealistic spirit of the book and is reasoned enough to prevent
contenders from claiming it should be more simple.
The second chapter also argues that liberal theory is compatible with state
obligated coercion in the form of paternalism, where the coherently
defined liberal state has the best understanding of the child’s interests,
i.e., the development of autonomy, in mind. Coercion with the intent of
such development is permissible because the capacity it fosters can later
be used to overcome future coercion. Coercion by parents, however, is
often problematically geared toward the actualization of parents’ own
particular, content-driven, conceptions of the good improperly imposed
on children who are not yet capable of choosing the good for themselves.
She tackles parental rights claims to dictating the educational interests of
children well by explaining that the child’s interest in the development of
his or her own capacity for autonomy should be privileged over the
muscle-flexing exercise of parental autonomy. She suitably uses the case
of religious fundamentalist children who are raised to be heteronymous
and to uphold one narrow view of the good life as an example of
unjustified parental control which limits the child’s development of
autonomy. She draws on James Dwyer briefly as she differentiates
parents’ privileges to guide children from mistaken claims to parents’
rights to control them. It seems that more of his work could provide
empirical cases in which state-controlled education for autonomy must
make significant demands in order to ensure the well-being and
autonomy of its students. Expanding on this distinction could also bolster
her later discussion of school choice.
Levinson contends that schools whose structure is autonomy-oriented
through their privileging of critical reflection, reasoned argument,
toleration, and other self-legislating endeavors are locations where, when
immersed, children would most likely develop their own capacities. She
suggests the opposite of most liberals’ intuitions about schooling, a
school detached from the particular values and commitments held by
parents or democratically chosen by the local community. In such a
school, parental involvement would be welcomed, but parental voices
could not shape the aims and content of the school. Levinson believes
that this demand of liberal education would free children from parental
tyranny which requires strict adherence to a particular conception of the
good, bringing them into a plural community of culturally imbedded
others where autonomy and defensible notions of the good life can be
fostered. Although respectful of the developmental appropriateness of
such activity, I fear she underestimates the strain children may feel when
torn between the visions of life and education they receive from their
state school and those upheld at home, if they have a home life stable
enough to pass down a vision at all. Perhaps this is a negligible first
generation effect that would be overcome once those children, schooled
in the value of autonomy, themselves become parents. Nonetheless, the
pain for students in the present is certainly hard to overlook. There is
also another knotty future issue that Levinson does not sufficiently
address. Following a few generations of schooling under her liberal
educational ideal, many now viable ways of life would no longer be
tenable because they would be in conflict with fully developed
autonomy. This loss is detrimental to rich pluralism and diversity, as
fellow liberal William Galston (1991; 2002) would most likely agree.
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Levinson’s work is particularly interesting when read in conjunction
with William Galston’s latest release, Liberal Pluralism (2002). The
contradictions between the two make the demands Levinson is
articulating clearer and shed light on their intensity. Galston argues
against educational policy like that advocated by Levinson which places
the coercive power of the state in the specific direction of upholding one
specific, autonomy-driven, view of the good life. He contends that such
an act violates the negative liberty of citizens. Galston also disagrees
with Levinson regarding parental rights. With two key liberal
commentators struggling over such a monumental topic, the reading of
both is worthwhile and intriguing. Levinson would most likely contend
that liberalism is not about maximization of choices, but about fostering
good options which are in accord with liberal citizenship. This is a hard
sell to make to those who see narrowly defining the good life in terms of
autonomy as antithetical to liberalism itself. Inclusion of her thorough
response to this matter would make her argument for implementation
more robust.
Unlike many liberal commentators, Levinson gives more than just a
cursory nod to the arguments of “deschoolers, functionalists, and other
radical theorists” (p. 82) regarding the hidden curriculum that would
most likely continue to operate in the detached school she suggests.
Instead of shrugging off their critique, she adopts their insights, overtly
including the hidden curriculum, though renaming it the “informal
curriculum”. She claims that the open discussion of this aspect of
schooling would be a valuable, knowable, and recognizable lesson in her
ideal school. She hopes that it can be used to overcome “autonomyinhibiting, capitalist-driven education reform” (p. 86) when explicitly
used to unveil these underpinnings typically functioning in schools.
She turns next to discussing civic education. Though the transition feels a
bit awkward, the topic’s inclusion is necessary to making her portrayal
of autonomy in a weak perfectionist state more thorough and to position
her work amongst others who have recently considered civic education,
though typically (as in the case of Amy Gutmann) more narrowly
discussed in terms of democratic education. Levinson argues that
education for autonomy and education for citizenship are not only
compatible, but are also mutually reinforcing. Because civic education
ensures the maintenance of a healthy liberal state which protects liberal
freedoms and institutions, it is a prerequisite for the exercising of
autonomy which depends on those very freedoms and institutions. There
is also a considerable overlap of the skills and habits needed for both.
She claims that civic education alerts students to their liberties, showing
them how and to what extent they may act on them. She draws on the
commonality of civic demands placed on all political actors to argue that
the ideal liberal school should be common, with mutual language,
common civic history, and some shared values. Schools should be a
place where the private-public distinction of political liberalism is
blurred (though not relinquished) through the minimally discriminatory
incorporation of private commitments into the public identity cultivated
in the school. She analyzes the treatment of private identities and public
character within English, French, and American schools as she reaches
this conclusion. She also contends that civic education offers a stable,
‘thick’ cultural identity which can be adopted by those students who are
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unable to achieve embeddedness within the culture of their private home.
It also provides the necessary shared and stable conditions for agency.
This common identity arising from civic education can in some ways
resolve the conflict between the development of choice and the
development of cultural coherence which lingers in her autonomy-driven
liberalism, though some may contend that is a homogenizing solution.
The final chapter deals with some steps and conditions necessary for the
implementation of her ideal. One of these is granting parents and
children a controlled choice in selecting which school to attend from a
range of viable options. Levinson warns that choice here should not be
understood in terms of an educational marketplace where a service is
provided to consumers, a mistake many liberals intuitively make which
is itself illiberal because it ranks market over political and social values.
Rather, choice should be among student-centered, not consumer-driven
schools. Choice should be an active process guided by free advice from
academic professionals and not constrained by school-dictated
admissions criteria. Levinson adds that no potential option should be a
school which reflects a “fundamental or socially divisive” (p. 157)
conception of the good, for fear that such a school would fail to fulfill
the requirements of commonality or detachment. Therefore, religious
schools, as purveyors of divisive visions of the good life, could not fulfill
her liberal ideal. She does not, however, deny the functioning of private
schools, but does suggest that they would require more extensive
regulation to ensure that they meet liberal educational aims. She does a
superb job of complicating the school choice debate through the use of
conflicting empirical data and pinpointing theoretical differences
between opposing positions. This discussion is timely in the United
States given fresh evidence from test programs such as that in Cleveland
and concerns with national assessment following President George W.
Bush’s recent education mandates. It is also relevant to U.S. concerns
with illiberal and intolerant teachings occurring in some fundamental
religious schools. Although the discussion partially fulfills her aim of
making liberal theory tenable through responding to empirical issues that
affect it, its inclusion does not fit comfortably with the flow of the rest of
her more theoretical argument.
One liberal education demand which may not sit well with many readers
is that the aims of autonomy-developing liberal education should be
constitutionally enshrined, thereby obligating the state to achieve them,
though limiting public debate regarding them. Fixing educational aims in
this way is a bold assertion, as I am sure Levinson is well aware. Such a
suggestion limits the liberal ideal of public deliberation which won over
many liberals following its expression by John Rawls a decade ago
(1993). While she admits that debate about the elements of autonomy
and the curriculum most successful for its achievement could continue
following constitutional appointment, I am concerned about the publicly
perceived futility of such debates. The populous may feel that their
opinions are trivial in comparison to the will of a state already made
more powerful through Levinson’s assigning it even more control.
Throughout the book, she echoes and confirms many of the democratic
points of the more widely read Gutmann, but, more true to liberalism,
she argues that democratic deliberation, though important, should never
be able to override the essential aims of education. Republican controlled
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government and growing numbers of libertarians make talk of more state
controlled schooling unlikely in America. Though seemingly untimely
given its release in 1999 at the end of democratic presidential reign,
perhaps the book is even more pertinent to liberals who feel more
compelled now than ever to ensure that autonomy-based aims are being
met in schools free from false-consciousness. And to this I toast
Levinson and those encouraged to join her.
In her concluding remarks, Levinson insightfully recognizes that
legislation regarding and constitutional inscription of the aims of liberal
education are not enough to achieve her ideal. Political, legal, and
cultural reforms are required. Rigorous teacher training in the
importance and methods of developing autonomy is necessary, amongst
other things. Most of all, an “autonomy-valuing liberal culture” (p. 165)
is essential. To this end, she concludes by offering a challenge to citizens
who have been swayed by her argument, to act on the very dynamic
notion of liberalism which she has articulated. Her well-organized, clear
arguments which require only minor understanding of philosophic
methodology are likely to convince many already liberally persuaded
readers, as well as some skeptics, to heed her call. Her tone carries
conviction, which is not lost even when she admirably admits
uncertainties or potential objections to her views, and this may convince
even her more staunch critics to at least collaboratively join the
discussion.
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